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PROPERTY AND TAX EFFECTS OF A CONVEYANCE TO
HUSBAND AND WIFE AND THE SURVIVOR OF THEM,
WHERE THE HUSBAND PAYS THE FULL
CONSIDERATION
Recently there has arisen in South Carolina a question as to the
nature of the interests created by a conveyance to a husband and
wife and the survivor of them. Where the husband has paid the
full consideration for the property involved, certain estate and gift
tax considerations also come into the picture and the purpose of
this article is to explore these considerations and to estimate their
effects.
The 1953 case of Davis v. Davis' supposedly settled the property
law in this area.
The case involved the construction of a deed to land in Williams-
burg County sold to husband and wife and for which the husband
paid the full consideration. This deed recited in the granting clause
"to W. N. Parks and his wife Emma, as tenants by the entirety and
the survivor of them," and in the habendum "To have and to hold
by the parties of the second part and the survivor of them, their
heirs and assigns in fee simple forever." Two years later, the wife
died intestate, leaving as her heirs at law her husband and a daughter
by an earlier marriage. The husband later died intestate leaving his
second wife and a child by their marriage. The plaintiffs, grand-
children of the wife, brought this action against the latter wife and
daughter, seeking one half of the property of the estate, claiming that
the husband and wife held it as tenants in common and one half be-
longed to the wife's heirs at law. The defendants' contention was that
the husband became the sole owner by survivorship and the wife's heirs
had no interest. The circuit judge sustained the defendants' demurrer
and dismissed the action. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in a three-two decision, affirmed the court below. Judge Oxner
writing for the majority stated that although the estate of tenancy
by the entirety had been abolished by statute in South Carolina, the
intention of the grantor was clear and that the survivor would take
the entire estate upon the death of the other spouse either on the
theory of viewing this conveyance as a tenancy in common for life
with a contingent remainder in the survivor, or as a tenancy in com-
mon in fee with an executory limitation in the surviving spouse.
1. 223 S. C. 182, 75 S. E. 2d 46 (1953).
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Justices Baker and Taylor dissented on the ground that this language
created a joint tenancy which was severable by the death of one of
the joint tenants and distributable as a tenancy in common.
This case, to a large degree, settled the law in this state as to the
interest created by a deed or devise which at common law would have
made the parties tenants by the entirety. Indeed, the earlier cases in
this state are all to the effect that where land is conveyed to husband
and wife, with provision for survivorship or with nothing else ap-
pearing, the husband and wife became seised of an estate by the
entirety. Neither could alien so as to bind the other and the survivor
took the whole. 2 The Married Women's Separate Property Owners
Acts and the Constitutions of 1868 and 1895 exerted a profound
effect on the estate of tenancy by the entirety in South Carolina.
Under these provisions, the wife's interest in her property during
coverture was made absolute. Her property was no longer subject to
levy and sale for her husband's debts, but were held as her separate
property and could be dealt with by her in the same manner as if
she were unmarried.3
In 1907 was decided the case of Green v. Cannady
4 which held
that the Constitutions and the above mentioned legislation destroyed
the oneness of husband and wife as to their property rights and,
therefore, that a married woman may become a tenant in common
with her husband upon a grant to both.
The Green case, however, only involved a conveyance to husband
and wife (and other third parties) with nothing else appearing. The
question of a conveyance to husband and wife with an express pro-
vision for survivorship was left open by this decision. The Davis case
was the first case in this state since the separate property owners
acts to deal with this type of limitation.
In both the Davis and Green cases the court excluded the possibility
of joint tenancy in these situations because of an act of the Legisla-
ture in 1791 providing that at the death of one joint tenant the
property is to be distributable as a tenancy in common.
5 A number
of other states in this situation have held that the limitation in
question creates a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship.6 Even
in states where tenancy by the entirety no longer exists, this has
2. Bomar v. Mullins, 4 Rich. Eq. 80 (S. C. 1851); Railway Company v.
Scott, 38 S. C. 34, 16 S. E. 185 (1892); McLeod v. Tarrant, 39 S. C. 275, 17
S. E. 773 (1892).
3. CoNSTI TI'ON OF 1868, ART. XIV, § 8.
4. 77 S. C. 193, 56 S. E. 954 (1907).
5. CODE OF LAWS OV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-55.
6. Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 288 Ky. 291, 156 S. W. 2d 827 (1941).
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been the favored interpretation of such a deed or will which would
have created a tenancy by the entirety at common law.7 Only in
limited situations have other states allowed an express provision for
survivorship to be attached to a joint interest and still construed the
interest as a tenancy in common, and these decisions have all been
based on the fact that the parties expressed a clear intention to
treat the tenancy as a tenancy in common. 8
In the Davis case, it would appear that the Supreme Court was
faced with a dilemma. The entire court agreed that the estate of
tenancy by the entirety has been abolished in this state. They then
had two possible alternatives: first, to treat the conveyance as a joint
tenancy which, due to the act of 1791, would be distributable as a
tenancy in common with the result that that intention of the grantor
would be clearly thwarted; or second, to give effect to the grantor's
intention by creating in favor of the survivor a contingent remainder
or an executory limitation. If this were done, the tenancy, by neces-
sity, must be treated as a tenancy in common, for if treated as a
joint tenancy, the statute would apply and the death of the joint
tenant would sever it. This was the position of the majority of the
court but the two dissenting justices expressed a preference for the
former interpretation.
The majority of the court quoted with approval from Corpus Juris
Secundumn :9
"An estate of survivorship will be created by a deed mani-
festing an intention to create such an estate. Where such in-
tention is clearly stated, it will be effective regardless of the
nature of the estate otherwise conveyed." (emphasis added).
and again from Tiffany on Real Property :10
".. . when one makes a gift to two or more with the right
of survivorship, it appears to be a reasonable conclusion that he
has in mind an indestructible right of survivorship. This view
that there is in such a case a tenancy in common for life with a
contingent remainder in favor of the survivor, or even that there
is a tenancy in common in fee simple with an executory limitation
in favor of the survivor, might seem more in accord with the
intention of the grantor or testator." (italics omitted).
7. Hughes v. Lumber Company, 19 Conn. Supp. 138, 110 A. 2d 499 (1954);
Bouska v. Bouska, 159 Kan. 276, 153 P. 2d 923 (1944); In re Richardson's
Estate, 229 Wis. 426, 282 N. W. 585 (1938).
8. Douds v. Fresen, 392 11. 477, 64 N. E. 2d 729 (1946).
9. 26 C. J. S., Deeds § 127, p. 429 (pp. 970-971 in 1956 ed.), quoted at 223
S. C. 188.
10. 2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 424, pp. 207-208 (3rd ed. 1939), quoted at
223 S. C. 190-191.
1959]
3
Cromer: Property and Tax Effects of a Conveyance to Husband and Wife and
Published by Scholar Commons, 1959
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
This then, would seem to be the law in this state today that when
land is given to a husband and wife and the survivor of them, the
type of tenancy created is a tenancy in common, but the estate will
pass to the surviving spouse in the same manner as if the conveyance
had created a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy.
A conveyance of this type poses at least three tax problems. Virst,
to what extent will the deceased spouse's interest be includible in
his gross estate for estate tax purposes, presuming that it was the
decedent who paid the full consideration for the property conveyed
to him and his wife in this form?
The Internal Revenue Code has a special provision for taxing the
gross estate of a deceased joint tenant or tenant by the entirety. In
these situations, his gross estate includes that "interest" in the proper-
ty for which he paid the consideration.
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants
by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the en-
tirety by the decedent and spouse except such part thereof as
may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person
(or spouse) and never to have been received or acquired by the
latter from the decedent for less than an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or in money's worth.
PROVIDED, that where such property, or any part thereof,
or part of the consideration with which such property was acquir-
ed, is shown to have been at any time to have been acquired,
by any other person from the decedent for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or in money's worth, there
shall be excepted only such part of the value of such property
as is proportionate to the consideration furnished by such other
person?' (emphasis added)
Where the decedent and spouse hold land as joint tenants, or as
tenants by the entirety, only the proportion shown to have belonged
originally to the surviving spouse or to have been acquired by her
for an adequate and full consideration in money or in money's worth
can be excluded from the gross estate of the deceased husband, and
if the husband paid the full consideration, the entire value of the joint
property is includible in the gross estate of the deceased husband.12
On the other hand, there is no express provision in either the
1939 or the 1954 Internal Revenue Codes dealing with property held
11. INT. Rv. COD oF 1954, § 2040.
12. Estate of J. 1-1. Heidt, 170 F. 2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Steen v. United
States, 195 F. 2d 379, cert. den. 344 U. S. 822 (1952).
[Vol. 11
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as tenants in common, but through judicial decisions it has become
settled that where one tenant in common dies, only the decedent's
fractional interest is includible in his gross estate. Where the decedent
and another (or his spouse) hold property as tenants in common,
only one half of the property so held may be included in his gross
estate for estate tax purposes.'3
The different tax effects are obvious here. If, on the one hand, the
conveyance in question is viewed as a tenancy in common, only one
half of the value of the property will'be included in the husband's
gross estate. If, on the other band the Commissioner views this as
a joint tenancy, as did the dissenting two justices in the Davis case
(and as would the rest of the court but for the South Carolina
statute abolishing survivorship in joint tenancies), the entire value
of the property in question would be includible in the deceased hus-
band's gross estate. Furthermore, under the Federal statute, the
burden of proof is on the survivor to show the consideration fur-
nished.' 4 If the decedent's gross estate be taxed viewing the estate
as a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety, only if the wife's
contributions can be shown to be equal to those of her deceased hus-
band, can she obtain the same tax advantage as she would taking as
a tenant in common - namely having only one half of the value of
such property included in the decedent's gross estate.' 5
The form of ownership is decisive in these cases. Generally the
question of whether or not property is held by a decedent and another
as joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, or tenants in common is a
question of local property law.16
We have examined the state of the local property law in South
Carolina. In the Davis case, the transaction was regarded as creating
a tenancy in common with a contingent remainder or an executory
interest in the survivor as a matter of form. In substance, however,
our Supreme Court allowed the interest to pass by survivorship.
Though survivorship is not the only characteristic of a joint tenancy
and may be annexed to a tenancy in common, as pointed out by Justice
Oxner in the majority opinion, it is the characteristic which gave
rise to the different manner of taxing the gross estate of the decedent
in the law of estate taxation.' 7 The gross estate cannot be measured
until the decedent's death, so the factor of alienability or severance
13. Harvey v. United States, 185 F. 2d 463 (7th Cir. 1953).
14. Estate of S. Silberstein, 21 B. T. A. 188, Dec. 6450.
15. Drummond v. Paschal, 75 F. Supp. 46 (D. C. Ark. 1947).
16. Greenwood v. Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1943).
17. Estate of Brockway v. Commissioner, 219 F. 2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954).
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would play no part in its consideration. The section of the Internal
Revenue Code dealing with "joint interests" was formulated solely
to keep a man from escaping estate tax liability on lands purchased
solely by him but the title to which was "shared" with another who
would take the whole estate at his death and one half free and clear
from estate taxes. Is it not arguable then, that by giving effect to
a survivorship provision in a conveyance to husband and wife, our
Supreme Court has made this a "joint interest" within the purview
of the Federal statute?
There is, moreover, a trend toward the courts being guided more
by the substance than the form in evaluating certain transactions
for tax consequences. This is aptly reflected in the following excerpt
from a recent opinion:
In dealing with a tax matter, we must be guided by the sub-
stance and not the effect of what was done. . . . This is not to
say that we are to disregard the language used in the contract
which may be involved, or the methods used to effect the trans-
action. But, rather, we must consider the form and steps used
in their relation to the intended and accomplished entire trans-
action.1 8
This reasoning has been applied also when dealing with the question
of what type of interest is created when two or more persons hold
property concurrently. Courts have even disregarded the type interest
designated by state courts when deciding property questions, when
the substance of the transaction showed that another type interest
was intended. In the case of Pierotti v. United StatesID the California
state court had held that husband and wife owned property as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship. The Commissioner then tried
to include the entire value of the property in the deceased husband's
gross estate. The surviving spouse's claim for refund was granted
and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court hold-
ing that in spite of the state court's decision, in the light of the form
of the conveyance and the surrounding circumstances, the intent
of the spouses to hold the land as "community property" governed
the transaction and the "joint interest" section of the 1939 Code did
not apply. Might not the court have applied the same reasoning if
the converse of this situation had been in question?
In the Brockway case2 0 the court held the determinative feature
to be the type of interests which the parties intended to create. When
18. Hatch's Estate v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1952).
19. 154 F. 2d 758 (9th Cir. 1946).
20. Estate of Brockway v. Commissioner, 219 F. 2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954).
[Vl. I I
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the argument was made that this interest should be treated as a
tenancy in common, the court replied :21
If a competent lawyer, such as he who drew the instrument, had
intended to create a "tenancy in common with cross remainders
for life with remainder in fee to the ultimate survivor," or "a
tenancy in common in fee simple with an executory limitation
in favor of the survivor," as petitioner now suggests, the lawyer
could have used appropriate language. If it be thought his testi-
mony is competent to interpret the instrument he actually drew,
he is positive that he intended to create a joint tenancy.
The editors of Prentice-Hall's Estate and Gift Tax loose leaf service
express an opinion that in those states which have abolished the estate
of tenancy by the entirety, but which do allow the creation of tenancies
with the right of survivorship in husband and wife, these tenancies
should fall within the tax purview of section 2040 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.
2 2
The foregoing and other authorities lead the writer to believe
that should this problem be litigated in this state, that the Federal
District Court or the Tax Court might well hold that this type interest
is a "joint interest" within the meaning of the Federal statute and
where the decedent spouse has paid the whole consideration, his gross
estate will include the full value of the property held under such a
tenancy. Even if a result favorable to the surviving spouse is reached,
the expenses of litigation might be avoided if the estate planner or
his counsel adopted some other means to effect this plan.
Two further tax problems which might possibly arise involve the
marital deduction for estate tax purposes and possible gift tax conse-
quences under a transfer of this type. Section 2056 of the 1954 In-
ternal Revenue Code allows the surviving spouse to deduct from
her husband's gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest
in property which has passed or passes from the decedent to the
survivor to the extent that such interest is used in determining the
decedent's gross estate and so long as it and other deductions do not
exceed fifty percent of the decedent's adjusted gross estate.
Does the interest of the survivor here "pass from the decedent"
so as to allow the marital deduction? If this be construed as a joint
tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety, clearly it does. The Code so
provides :23
Definition. - For purposes of this section, an interest in
21. Id. at 402.403.
22. 4-A P.-,TICE.-HALL, FeDERAL TAX StRVICE f 125,151, p. 125,351 (1956).
23. INT. Rtv. CODX OF 1954, § 2056 (e).
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property shall be considered as passing from the decedent to any
person if and only if -
. . . (5) such interest was, at the time of the decedent's death,
held by such person and the decedent (or by them and any other
person) in joint ownership with right of survivorship ...
In the case of Awtry's Estate v. Commissioner24 the court held
that real estate taken by survivorship by virtue of the parties being
joint tenants (or tenants by the entirety) passed from the decedent
so as to comply with the statute and the marital deduction was allowed.
It is interesting to note that this case arose in Iowa where in a joint
tenancy situation the survivor does not acquire title from the deceased
but from the deed. 25 The survivor acquires title from the deed in a
contingent remainderman or executory limitation situation. The fur-
ther question remains: if this be construed as a tenancy in common
with a survivorship arrangement can the surviving spouse take the
marital deduction? Again the answer would appear to be in the
affirmative. Perhaps such a tenancy comes within the language of
the statute "joint ownership with right of survivorship." Even if it
does not come within the statute, the Commissioner has construed
this requirement most liberally. The Commissioner has ruled that
exempt property set off to the widow by local statute constitutes an
interest in property "passing from the decedent" and which she can
deduct from the gross estate of the deceased spouse.2 6 It would seem
then, that whether the survivor received it on the theory of a con-
tingent remainder or an executory limitation, the wife could claim
the marital deduction in this situation.
There is also a gift tax problem involved 'here. We have assumed
that the husband paid the full consideration for the property so con-
veyed. As the wife paid no part of the consideration for the property,
her interest therein would seem to arise by virtue of a "gift" from
her husband. Is this gift taxable to the husband in the year of the
transfer? For the answer again we must look to the Code. Section
2515 specifically exempts the creation of tenancies by the entirety or
joint tenancies between husband and wife with the right of survivor-
ship from gift tax liability unless the donor should elect to treat it
as taxable, which he may wish to do under certain circumstances.
If the property is subsequently sold by the spouses, however, gift
tax liability will immediately arise in the same manner as if the hus-
band had made a gift to his wife in the amount of the entire proceeds
24. Awtry's Estate v. Commissioner, 221 F. 2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955).
25. Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 149 N. W. 613 (1914).
26. Rx v. RUL. 55-419, Cum. B.. 458.
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of the sale. No gift tax liability arises at the death of the husband,
however. 2 7
If this transfer is looked upon as creating a tenancy in common
between the husband and wife the result will be different.
At the time of purchase, if the wife takes as a tenant in common,
she takes one half of the property as a "gift" and the husband will
be liable to pay taxes on that gift at the end of the year. The donor
shall be, of course, entitled to a one half deduction for a gift to his
spouse of an interest in property.2 8 Nevertheless, if the amount paid
for the property is substantial, the tax on the gift might still be
heavy and could have been avoided entirely had the husband and
wife not taken the property as tenants in common here.
These are problems which will continue to be with the estate plan-
ner or his attorney until the courts rule on the tax effects of this
type of conveyance in South Carolina under the present state of the
law.
JAmiS L wis MANN CROMMr.
27. INT. REV. COD or 1954, § 2515 (b).
28. Id. § 2523.
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